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New England’s wholesale electricity market has been in operation, since May 1, 1999. When the 
market began it was understood that the rules were not perfect (Cramton and Wilson 1998). However, it 
was decided that it was better to start the market with imperfect rules, rather than postpone the market for 
an indefinite period. After several months of operation, we now have a sense of the extent market 
imperfections have resulted in observed problems. Here we study the three reserve markets—ten-minute 
spinning reserve (TMSR), ten-minute non-spinning reserve (TMNSR), and thirty-minute operating 
reserve (TMOR); we also discuss the closely related operable capability (OpCap) market. The paper 
covers the first four months of operation from May 1 to August 31, 1999. It is based on the market rules 
and their implementation by the ISO, and the market data during this period, including bidding, operating, 
and settlement information. Since that data are confidential, we have presented only aggregate 
information in the tables and figures that follow.
2 Although this paper will cover only the reserves 
markets, we have studied the data from the energy, AGC, and capacity markets as well. Since all of the 
NEPOOL markets are interrelated, one cannot hope to understand one market without having an 
understanding of the others. 
In this paper, we hope to accomplish four tasks:  
1.  Identify the potential market flaws with these markets. 
2.  Look at the performance of the markets to see if the potential problems have materialized. 
3.  Evaluate the ISO’s short-term remedies for these market flaws. 
4.  Propose alternative medium-term solutions to the identified problems. 
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We conclude that the reserve markets are seriously flawed. Looking at the data, one might argue that 
most of the time these markets are working well; that is, prices are “reasonable” most of the time. But this 
is simply a reflection that most of the time these markets are irrelevant—most of the time the resources 
these markets price are not scarce. In the absence of scarcity, the markets are doing a reasonable job of 
pricing and assignment. But this is similar to an air conditioner working well in the winter. It works well, 
simply because it is not asked to do anything. Like an air conditioner, the reserve markets should be 
evaluated when they are stressed—when the markets are actually resolving a problem of scarcity. On this 
score, the markets have performed poorly (although better than the early months in some other markets, 
such as California). 
The poor performance of these markets is not a surprise. It is the result of basic market flaws. These 
flaws have been recognized by the ISO and NEPOOL participants, since well before the markets began 
operation. Unfortunately, there was insufficient time to fix these markets before operations began on May 
1, 1999. It was felt that the ISO would be able to introduce short-term fixes as needed in the early months 
of operation. This has worked reasonably well. The flaws have not been fatal. The ISO has been able to 
operate a workably-efficient and reliable wholesale electricity market. Indeed, it is remarkable how well 
the markets have worked, despite their flaws. One measure of this is that the cost of reserves is still a 
small percentage of total energy costs.
3 
Ideally, what is needed is a long-term fix to the basic design flaws in the reserve markets. 
NEPOOL’s Congestion Management and Multi-settlement Committee is in the process of developing a 
long-term solution. Realistically, it will not be possible to implement the long-term solution until late in 
the year 2000, at best. In the mean time, it is worthwhile to identify a medium-term fix that the ISO can 
implement within a matter of months. We present such a medium-term solution below.  
Recommendation: Eliminate the OpCap market. 
Given the nature of the market flaws and the difficulties of implementing more than a modest 
variation of the status quo, we believe the best approach is to eliminate the OpCap market. It is hard to 
argue that the OpCap market serves any useful purpose as presently designed. Since its operation has real 
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costs with no apparent gain, it is best to eliminate the market. (The ISO has taken our advice and 
eliminated the market as of March 1, 2000). 
Recommendation: Adopt the smart buyer model for the reserve markets. 
We recommend that the reserve markets continue in the medium-term, but with the ISO adopting a 
smart buyer model for reserves.
4 As a smart buyer, the ISO: 
1.  Never pays for additional reserves more than the economic value of the additional reserves. 
2.  Reduces its demand for reserves as reserve prices increase. 
3.  Shifts purchases toward higher quality reserves when they are priced less than lower quality reserves. 
In conducting the markets for reserves, the ISO is effectively purchasing reliability on behalf of load. The 
ISO has a responsibility to purchase wisely, given the aggregate preferences of load. On this basis, the 
ISO as smart buyer develops a demand curve for reserves that reflects the marginal value that additional 
reserves have for the system. 
The essential elements of the smart buyer model can be adopted in the medium-term. The ISO 
recently has implemented point 3 above. The reserves now are treated as a cascade with the ISO filling its 
need for lower quality reserves with higher quality reserves if the higher quality can be purchased at a 
lower price. The difficult step is establishing a demand curve for reserves, which reflects the marginal 
value of additional reserves. This will accomplish point 1. Point 2 is accomplished by integrating the 
demand curve with the unit commitment and dispatch programs. It will require some discussion among 
participants and regulators, but once new operating procedures are established the ISO can begin 
purchasing reserves according to its demand curve, rather than the current vertical “demand” curve, which 
does not reflect the marginal value of additional reserves. Details of how this might work are discussed in 
Section 4. 
Recommendation: Restructure the reserve markets. 
The basic flaws in the reserve markets stem from two features of the current markets: 
1.  The vertical “demand” curve, derived from a rigid reserve requirement, implies that prices are 
arbitrarily high in times of scarcity.   4
2.  Losing bidders face the same obligations as winning bidders. 
The first flaw is eliminated by constructing the true demand curve for reserves, based on the 
marginal value of additional reserves. The second flaw is solved by paying everyone that provides 
reserves in real time the market clearing reserve price. The real time supply curve is calculated by the ISO 
based on the state of the system. The supply corresponds to the quantity of reserves that is available in the 
system. The clearing price is then found at the intersection of this vertical supply curve with the demand 
curve for reserves. All units providing reserves are paid this clearing price. 
Recommendation: Create multi-settlement energy and reserve markets as soon as possible. 
In the long term, the reserve markets should be restructured. NEPOOL and ISO New England should 
continue to work at designing and implementing multi-settlement energy and reserve markets. The 
medium-term solution that we propose is an important step in moving toward the final goal but is not a 
permanent fix. It does not make sense to purchase the entire reserve requirement in real time. The real 
time market should simply be a balancing market to acquire and price deviations from the day-ahead 
scheduled reserve plan. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 identifies the potential market flaws. Section 2 
demonstrates that the flaws were observed in each of these markets. Section 3 describes the ISO’s short-
term fix of the flaws, and evaluates whether the ISO’s remedy has been successful. Section 4 presents an 
alternative remedy that could be implemented in the medium-term. Section 5 discusses how the ISO could 
implement a downward-sloping demand curve for reserves. Section 6 describes the relationship between 
the reserve markets and the energy market. Section 7 presents a long-term solution to the reserve markets, 
and demonstrates that the medium-term solution is an important step toward the long-term solution. 
Section 8 concludes. 
1 Potential  market  flaws 
The energy and reserve markets represent the core of the system; there is no separate market for 
transmission, although one is under development. These markets cannot be viewed in isolation, as each 
interacts with the others. In what follows, we examine the markets as a system, recognizing any 
interdependencies. However, the discussion focuses on the three reserve markets and the OpCap market.  
                                                                                                                                                                           
4 The smart buyer model is related to, but different from, the Rational Buyer Model implemented by the 
California ISO.   5
The Table 0 below presents the salient features of the seven markets.
5 The three reserve markets and 
OpCap are structured in a similar way, and hence all four suffer from the same basic problems.  
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1.1  Losing bidders face the same obligations as winning bidders 
The critical distinction between the energy market and the reserve markets is in the last column of 
the table above: Losers provide the service? In the energy market, the answer is no. Only the winning 
bidders provide the service (energy): (1) bidders submit supply schedules, (2) a market clearing price is 
determined from the intersection of the aggregate supply schedule and the realized demand, (3) bids at or 
below the clearing price are accepted, and (4) the winning bidders receive the clearing price for product 
(energy) delivered. However, in the reserve and OpCap markets, there is no difference in the costs or 
risks incurred by those participants who receive payment in the market and those who do not. Every 
participant is providing the same service, but only those designated are paid. As a result the only rational 
bids in the market are bids of zero (to insure selection in the hope there is any positive price) or a bid that 
is an attempt to set the clearing price. The winning bidders are receiving payment for product delivered, 
but the losing bidders are delivering the product as well without receiving any payment. 
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This paradox that losing bidders incur the same costs as winning bidders stems from two features of 
the current markets. The first is the obligation of generators to respond to dispatch instructions. The 
second is the single-settlement system. Since the market is settled after the fact, the generators do not 
know until real time whether they are providing energy, and they do not know whether they were 
designated for reserves until after real time. 
This problem was recognized in the March 5, 1999, Multi-settlement Proposal, which was approved 
by NEPOOL and filed with FERC in March 1999. Central to the current markets is the dispatch 
obligation of operable units. Both committed units and offline units are obligated to respond to ISO 
instructions.
6 Hence, the amount of TMSR in the system is the unloaded capacity of online units that can 
be ramped in ten minutes, the amount of TMSR+TMNSR is the unloaded capacity of online and offline 
units that can be ramped in ten minutes, and the amount of TMSR+TMNSR+TMOR is the unloaded 
capacity of online and offline units that can be ramped in thirty minutes. In real time, the ISO draws on 
the energy stack in merit order to balance the system. The ISO also designates in real time certain 
unloaded capacity as TMSR, TMNSR, or TMOR, based on the reserve offers. These designated resources 
are paid the corresponding reserve clearing price. 
The problem is that all rampable units are providing dispatch flexibility, yet only the designated 
one's are paid for it. This distorts the bidding. Regardless of what it costs to provide reserves, a bidder is 
better off being paid than not; hence, if it does not think it will determine the price, it should bid 0 to 
maximize the chance that it will be paid for reserves. Since others will do likewise, the equilibrium price 
is biased toward 0, assuming no market power. 
The markets do not give the participants a meaningful way to express the costs they incur in 
providing dispatch flexibility. In a real market, the winning bidders would be paid for the product 
delivered (dispatch flexibility), but losing bidders would not be forced to deliver the product as well. A 
solution to this problem is presented in Section 4. 
1.2  In times of scarcity, prices in these markets are arbitrarily high 
Four of the markets, TMSR, TMNSR, TMOR, and OpCap, are particularly vulnerable during periods 
in which all or nearly all available resources must be selected to meet the reserve requirements. In 
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situations where the reserve requirement cannot be met (Operating Procedure 4 conditions), prices may be 
arbitrarily high with no basis in cost and no economic constraint on bid behavior. In these situations, there 
are insufficient bids to satisfy the requirement. The ISO must accept all bids. 
The auction becomes equivalent to the game of “ask and it shall be given.” In this game, the 
auctioneer asks each participant to write a number on a piece of paper (a “bid”) and agrees to pay each 
person selected the number of dollars bid by the person with the highest bid selected. If there are ten 
bidders and the auctioneer announces that seven of the ten will be selected in each round, there is a 
pressure to drive the prices to zero, even if there are real costs associated with participation. However, if 
the auctioneer announces in advance that all ten will be selected, the only limit on the bids is the 
auctioneer’s bankruptcy. The forecast by the ISO of OP4 Conditions is equivalent to announcing that all 
bids in the reserve and OpCap markets will be selected. 
Faced with these incentives, certain participants have taken advantage of this vulnerability by 
submitting low bids in the OpCap market for most of the capacity of their units and high bids for one 
megawatt blocks near their units’ High Operating Limit. With this strategy, the bidder receives the 
clearing price on as large a quantity as possible when there is excess supply, and then in times of scarcity 
sets a very high clearing price. If others follow this sensible strategy, the OpCap price is either near zero 
or arbitrarily high, depending on whether there is excess supply. One cannot argue that this game of “ask 
and it shall be given” is an efficient means to compensate participants for offering capacity in times of 
shortage. Surely, well-designed energy and reserve markets are better instruments to reward those that 
offer scarce capacity. 
In a competitive market, when there is a shortage of supply, prices are determined from the 
aggregate demand curve. That is, in times of shortage, buyers respond to the higher prices by demanding 
less, which limits any price increases. Unfortunately, in the current reserve markets such a market 
response is not effective—demand for reserves and OpCap is completely inelastic. Hence, in times of 
shortage, there is no market constraint on what suppliers can bid. The point is that the bids are not 
reflective of any costs. The price is set at the whim of the bidder willing to submit the highest number. 
This is a clear case of market failure. 
The basic problem is the absence of a demand curve for reserves, which reflects the marginal value 
of additional reserves. A solution is suggested in Section 4.   8
1.3  OpCap provides a service of no value 
The OpCap market, which shares the problems above of the reserve markets, has an additional 
problem. OpCap provides a service of no value. OpCap is a holdover from an electricity market with 
regulated prices. While it had a purpose under regulated pricing, it has no role in a competitive electricity 
market. All the electricity market needs are well-designed energy and reserve markets. The OpCap market 
does not contribute in any way. It was eliminated by NEPOOL on March 1, 2000. 
OpCap is best thought of as an option. The ISO is buying an option to call the resource to provide 
energy or reserves in real time. In valuing this option, the critical number is the “strike price,” which in 
this case is the (minimum) price the ISO must pay the resource when it calls it to provide energy or 
reserves. The difficulty is that the strike price has no impact on whether the resource gets designated. It is 
designated solely on the basis of its OpCap bid. Hence, the resource can make the option worthless by 
bidding extremely high energy and reserve prices. An analogous situation would be selling an option to 
buy 100 shares of Microsoft stock tomorrow. How much would you be willing to pay for this option if 
you knew the seller would set the strike price after you offer a price for the option? Of course, the seller 
has an interest in setting an extremely high strike price, giving you the option to buy the 100 shares, but 
only at an extremely high price. Such an option has a value of 0. Similarly with the OpCap market, 
OpCap only has value if what is being offered is capacity that can be called at reasonable energy and 
reserve prices. Since the generators are making no such commitment, OpCap has zero value. 
One solution is to tie the designation of OpCap to the energy and/or reserve bids. Such an approach 
demonstrates the redundancy of the OpCap market with the reserves and energy markets. What the ISO 
needs to run the system is energy and dispatch flexibility. The ISO is better off buying these products 
directly in well-designed energy and reserve markets, rather than buying them indirectly in an OpCap 
market. At best the OpCap market is redundant. But more likely it is destructive to efficiency, since it is 
likely to distort bidding in the energy and reserve markets. Worse yet, it can stand as an entry barrier, 
since only certain capacity is able to supply OpCap. For example, a new entrant is only eligible to supply 
OpCap after certain conditions have been met. Also imports are not able to provide OpCap. Finally, 
OpCap discourages entry by rewarding nearly-mothballed capacity. This capacity may be able to limp 
along on OpCap and ICap payments, and not provide any useful service (it may submit extremely high 
bids in energy and reserve markets with long minimum run times and little ramping capability). Its 
presence discourages the entry of more useful capacity.    9
2  Performance of the markets 
We have conducted a preliminary analysis of all the bidding, pricing, and settlement data from May 
through August 1999. The data are most easily described in summary figures and tables. 
2.1  Understanding the figures and tables 
Figures 1–4 show the evolution of clearing prices and System Load from the opening of all markets 
on May 1 through the end of August. The price scale of each of the four Figures is truncated at 
$200/MWh. The energy price exceeded $200/MWh for 24 hours in June and 16 hours in July. The TMSR 
price exceeded $200/MWh for 13 hours in June and 14 hours in July. Neither the TMNSR price nor the 
TMOR price ever exceeded $200/MWh. 
Figure 5 shows the price duration curves for each of the four months under consideration. Each row 
represents a different price (Energy, TMSR, TMNSR, and TMOR), and each column represents a 
different month (May, June, July, and August). For example the graph in the upper left-hand corner of 
Figure 5 is the duration curve of the energy price in May. It shows that in May the energy price exceeded 
$20 nearly 100% of the time, but almost never exceeded $40. In order to present a reasonable scale the 
prices are truncated at $50/MWh  
Figure 6 shows how the prices of Energy, TMSR, TMNSR, and TMOR were correlated with load. 
Again each graph represents one month and one market. For example the graph in the lower right hand 
corner of Figure 6 shows how the TMOR price was correlated with System Load in August. The graph 
shows that only when load reached its highest levels did the TMOR price differ much from 0. As in 
Figures 1-4, Figure 6 only plots prices at or below $200/MWh. Load was consistently high in the hours 
when the energy price and TMSR price exceeded $200/MWh. 
Figure 7 shows average prices for each hour of the day for the period of May through August. The 
number of the hour on the x-axis is the ending time of the hour in question. For example, the TMSR price 
graph (the graph labeled with triangles) has a small spike above hour 23. This demonstrates that TMSR 
prices tended to be high for the hour ending at 11 pm. 
Tables 8 and 9 provide summary statistics of market conditions. The tables provide overall summary 
statistics, statistics broken down by month, and statistics broken down by month and peak versus off 
peak. Peak hours were defined with the help of Figure 7. For all peak hours (hour 09 through hour 22) 
average load from May 1 to August 31 exceeded 15,000 MWh.   10
2.2 Load 
Throughout the month of May load remained consistently low. The maximum value of 15,799 MWh 
was quite small compared to the peaks that were to come in June and July. Early in June New England 
experienced two significant heat waves. Hourly load rose to 18,375 MWh on June 1, 19,013 MWh on 
June 2, 20,866 MWh on June 7, and 20,794 on June 8. The June 7 load levels were particularly 
unexpected. By 8 AM on June 7 actual demand was already nearly 900 MW above forecast demand. The 
load peaks of June 28 and 29 were predicted. Hourly load reached an all-time record peak of 21,840 
MWh on the 28
th and 21,311 MWh on the 29
th. The forecast for the 29
th had been more ominous than the 
actual realization of demand. The highest load of the summer, 22,426 MWh, was recorded on July 6 
between 3 and 4 PM. Nine other days in July saw hourly load levels exceed 20,000 MWh with 4 of these 
days including load levels above 21,000 MWh. Load levels saw a slight decline in the month of August. 
The 21,000 MWh mark was not reached in any hour of August, although 20,000 MWh was surpassed 
numerous times. The average hourly load was slightly higher in August than it had been in June, but the 
peaks in August were not as intense. 
2.3 Market  performance 
Prices in the reserve markets behaved predictably. Prices were close to or at zero when system 
conditions resulted in excess supply of reserves. This was the case for most of the month of May (when 
load was low), and for most of the month of August (when system capacity was high). Prices were 
arbitrarily high when system conditions made reserve supplies scarce. June and July were both 
characterized by low reserve prices for the majority of hours, but wildly volatile price spikes on the days 
with the highest load levels. 
2.3.1 May 
As expected the reserve markets opened quietly. The relatively low load levels resulted in excess 
availability of all reserve types throughout the month of May. The TMNSR price and the TMOR price 
both stayed below $1 for the entire month. The TMSR price hit peaks of $10.65 May 19, $12.63 May 25, 
and $46.44 May 31, but remained below $1 for almost the entire rest of the month. 
2.3.2 June 
The first true test of the reserve markets came on June 1 and June 2, the first high load days of the 
season. The high load reduced the reserves available for the TMNSR and TMOR markets. The TMOR 
price broke the one-dollar barrier for the first time on hour 12 of June 1. Just two hours later the TMOR 
price hit $129. At the same time, the TMNSR price was $125, and the TMSR price was $0.80. This 
complete inversion of prices, with higher prices given to inferior reserves, persisted for much of June 1   11
and June 2. The TMSR price rose slightly on June 2, but did not rise excessively until June 7 and 8 when 
it exceeded $400 for several hours, and eventually surpassed $800. June 7 and 8 were also the first days 
that the energy price hit major peaks. Unlike the TMNSR and TMOR prices, the TMSR price includes an 
opportunity cost payment, which is based on the energy price. This opportunity cost component causes 
the TMSR price to increase significantly whenever the price of energy peaks. The TMNSR and TMOR 
prices also rose on June 7 and 8, but not nearly as much as the TMSR price. Figure 6 shows that although 
prices above $100 dollars were not uncommon in the TMNSR market during the month of June, the price 
never exceeded $150. 
Table 12 shows that on June 1, June 2, June 7, and June 8 the TMNSR price and the TMOR price 
regularly exceeded the energy price. Paying more for reserves than energy does not lead to rational cost 
minimizing procurement of electrical services. The ISO took steps to correct this market flaw on June 27 
when it implemented a cap on the reserve prices (see Section 3). The cap resulted in revised TMSR prices 
for June 27 and 28. The original operations data reported that the TMSR price reached $999/MWh on 
hour 12 of June 28 and $814/MWh on hour 13. When the cap was implemented the TMSR prices used for 
settlement were revised to $308/MWh and $489/MWh respectively.  
2.3.3 July 
July 6 experienced record prices in the TMSR market in addition to record load levels. The price of 
TMSR climbed to nearly $1000/MWh and remained above $700 for 6 hours. Originally energy prices 
also were set close to $1000/MWh for these hours, but these prices have since been revised to $500/MWh 
and lower. The TMNSR and TMOR prices continued their pattern of escalating with high load, but not 
excessively so. TMNSR and TMOR hit peaks of $116/MWh and $90/MWh respectively on July 6. The 
TMSR price should be higher than the inferior reserve prices, but a gap of over $800/MWh cannot be 
justified.  
Figures 2-5 show that although there were many spikes in the reserve prices throughout June and 
July, the prices between the spikes stayed very low. Figure 5 shows that in all three reserve markets the 
price stayed below $5 for at least 80% of the hours in each month. This price behavior is to be expected. 
The capacity of the system reaches its maximum during the summer months, so when load is not peaking 
there is plenty of capacity available for reserves. 
2.3.4 August 
Figures 1-6 demonstrate that all markets settled down significantly in August. No price exceeded 
$100/MWh in the entire month of August, and prices in the TMNSR and TMOR markets returned to 0   12
almost as frequently as they had in May. Part of this is due to an overall decline in load, but even when 
load was high, prices did not peak like they did in June and July. Table 12 shows that reserve prices, 
particularly the TMSR price, often reached the energy price cap during the second half of August, 
however this is somewhat misleading. Of the 22 hours when the energy price equaled the reserve price, 
19 were in hours that have been labeled off-peak (hour 23 through hour 08). In June and July the average 
energy price in hours when the TMSR price equaled the energy price was $192/MWh, whereas during 
August the average energy price in this type of hour was only $27/MWh. Chances are that although the 
cap had an effect on the TMSR price in many hours of August, the effects were not very big. TMSR 
prices often rise during late night hours as units shut down and availability falls, but the price increases 
tend to be small (see Figure 7). Figure 6 demonstrates that during the month of August the TMSR price 
was often high when load was low. This seemingly puzzling result is because of these late night price 
increases. Of the 46 hours in August that the TMSR price exceeded $10/MWh, 22 were between 11 pm 
and 1 am. These late night price spikes also exist in the other months (particularly for the hour ending at 
11 pm), but when compared to the peak hour price spikes they appear small.  
The return to low prices in August is best explained by the increase in total capacity available, not by 
the cap on prices. Figure 14 shows the sum of High Operating Limit and Low Operating Limit bid in each 
hour from May through August.
7 The upward trend of both graphs indicates the increase in available 
capacity as the summer progressed. Often in June and July, System Load exceeded the sum of High 
Operating Limit and the market was forced to search for imports. This never happened in August.  
2.4  Reserve designations and price inversions 
Reserve designations are often assigned in such a way that the total cost of supplying reserves, 
measured by payments to suppliers, is not minimized.
8 This is possible because the markets are cleared 
sequentially—TMSR then TMNSR then TMOR. The designations of June 1 provide an example of this. 
                                                      
7 Participant’s day-ahead bids include the physical operating characteristics of their generating units. The 
submissions of High Operating Limit and Low Operating Limit are used in scheduling and dispatch to 
keep units within a safe operating range. High Operating Limit is also used in the calculation of available 
reserve capacity.  
8 In most markets the cost minimizing choice of suppliers is necessary for economic efficiency. However, 
in an ex post clearing reserve market the designation of who gets paid for reserves does not determine 
who supplies the good or any costs incurred by the suppliers. Reserve designations determine the 
financial costs of the ISO, but do not affect real time costs of units that are available to supply reserves. 
Real time reserve designations affect the efficiency of the markets by influencing unit availability and 
capacity investment decisions. Financial cost minimization is a reasonable objective for the selection of 
reserve designations because it limits the ability of suppliers to abuse this fundamentally flawed market.    13
There was sufficient reserve availability that afternoon to meet the TMSR requirement, but all the 
inexpensive MWs available were then consumed. Hence, TMNSR and TMOR had to use more expensive 
resources. Units that normally receive TMNSR or TMOR designations were given TMSR designations 
instead, so the price had to increase for the inferior reserve bid stacks to clear the markets. One asset was 
designated as providing 119 MWh of TMSR, 197 MWh of TMNSR, and 8 MWh of TMOR on hour 12 of 
June 1. The same asset’s designations became 368 MWh of TMSR, 12 MWh of TMNSR, and 0.75 MWh 
of TMOR by hour 14. This bidder’s resources were shifted away from the inferior reserves despite a 
TMNSR bid of $0.65 and a TMOR bid of $0.55. A smart buyer of ancillary services would have procured 
TMSR from another source in order to save this bidder for the inferior services.  
The result of this procurement was a complete inversion of prices—the TMOR price ($129) 
exceeded the TMNSR price ($125), which exceeded the TMSR price ($.80). An inversion of reserve 
prices, which is common to other sequential systems, like California, occurred in 25 hours in June, 17 
hours in July, and 8 hours in August. Price inversions occur because as load rises and reserve margins 
drop, the constraint on the level of thirty-minute reserves typically binds first. Allowing the TMOR price 
to rise above the TMSR price represents a failure to recognize that a TMSR unit provides thirty-minute 
reserves at least as well as a TMOR unit does. The cap on reserve prices partially corrects this problem. 
2.5 Operating  procedure  4 
Throughout the summer the ISO responded to tight system conditions by implementing Operating 
Procedure 4 (OP4). This allowed the Real Time SPD to drop the reserves that it cleared below what was 
required. Over the course of the day on June 7 the actual reserve designations assigned fell below 40% of 
requirement for TMSR and eventually fell to zero for both TMNSR and TMOR.
9 Similar actions were 
taken on other dates during the summer including June 8, June 28, July 6, and July 16. When load rose at 
the end of July, reserve prices rose, but the designations remained high.  
Price spikes in the reserve markets created large windfalls for those that received designations, but 
nonetheless the cost burden of supplying reserves was limited. Reserve prices were consistently high in 
OP4 hours, but total designations were low, so the product of the two did not rise as drastically as the 
price. Figure 11 shows that the cost of supplying the three reserves very rarely exceeded 5% of the total 
payments for energy and reserves. Figure 11 also demonstrates that in the hours that the system 
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experiences the highest load levels the share of payments made for inferior reserves falls.
10 It rarely 
became necessary for the SPD to drop the amount of TMSR that it cleared below what was required, so in 
the tightest hours most of the payments for reserves go to TMSR.  
The limited cost of supplying reserves should not be declared a great success of the markets. A 
bidder who knows that OP4 will be implemented has incentive to bid excessively high in both the reserve 
markets and the energy market (see Section 6). If the energy bid is so high that it is not accepted, there is 
no great loss for the bidder – his reserve bids necessarily will be accepted and a high reserve price will be 
paid. Because of this interdependency, the inefficiency of the reserve markets creates distortions in the 
energy market. In hours when OP4 is implemented, the size of the reserve markets may shrink, but the 
distortions caused by inefficient reserve prices grow.  
2.6 Bidding  behavior 
Figures 13 shows an estimate of the aggregate bid stack in the TMNSR market for each hour of the 
morning of June 7. Data on reserve quantity available from each generating unit is not available, so 
quantity was calculated using hourly bid and settlement data including High Operating Limit (HOL), 
Generation, TMSR Designation, and Response Rate. Some bidders rarely receive TMNSR designations 
despite low TMNSR bids, and are not included in the aggregate availability totals. Figure 13 shows that 
the volatility in the reserve market prices is not caused by participants drastically changing their bids from 
hour to hour. The volatility arises because as generation and superior reserve category designations 
increase, the bid stacks get shifted dramatically to the left. If the TMNSR stack shifts such that the plateau 
in the 3 to 4 dollar range is marginal, prices stay low, but as soon as this plateau is passed prices escalate. 
By noon on June 7 a shortage of TMNSR existed and the ISO was forced to except all bids. The price of 
TMNSR rose to the top of the stack, $150/MWh.   
The bid stacks move only slightly to the right at a price of $150/MWh. Two lead participants bid 
four generating units in the TMNSR market at a price of $150/MWh in every single hour from May 1 to 
August 31. These units were given positive designations of as high as 30 MWh in 92 different hours 
between June 1 and August 17. The availability added by the 4 units is minimal (the stacks move only 
slightly to the right at a price of $150), but nonetheless these units had a large influence on price 
                                                      
10 Energy revenues for each hour shown in Figure 25 are calculated as Energy Clearing Price times Load 
Meter Readings plus Uplift Payment plus Congestion Uplift Payment. Since the energy market is a 
residual market not all of this revenue is received in market transactions, but the value of energy produce 
to serve native load is best estimated using the clearing price of the pool. The percentages referred to are 
the percentage of energy revenue plus TMSR revenue plus TMNSR revenue plus TMOR revenue.   15
formation in many hours of June and July. Not surprisingly, both of the lead participants control other 
units that bid lower prices in the TMNSR market. All of these units benefited when the price was set at 
$150/MWh. 
Tables 15, 16, and 17 give some indication of the bidding behavior of market participants for the 
entire period of May through August. The tables focus on two issues: how often units submit zero bids 
and how often units set the clearing price. To weight the frequency of these occurrences we use reserve 
designations and reserve revenue. Because hourly prices are averages of five-minute prices, and because 
more than one unit can submit the same bid, more than one unit can help set the clearing price in any 
given hour. If a unit submitted a bid that was greater than or equal to the clearing price, and received a 
positive designation, it is probable that the unit set the clearing price for at least some of the hour. The 
inter-temporal optimization of the SPD causes some high bids to be accepted even though they do not 
help set the clearing price, but this is relatively rare. In the majority of hours there is only one bidder with 
a bid as high as the clearing price. The TMSR market was not analyzed because the ISO considers lost 
opportunity cost in addition to bids to determine a clearing price. We did not have sufficient five-minute 
data to analyze this market. 
Tables 15 and 16 analyze bidding by type of unit. The revenue and designations earned by each 
individual unit when the unit was bidding zero or bidding at least the clearing price were calculated. The 
units were then grouped by unit type, and revenue and designation values aggregated together. Tables 15 
and 16 show that fossil fuel burning generators tend to submit zero bids for TMNSR and TMOR whereas 
hydro resources are more likely to submit high bids and set the price. Overall, 74% of all TMNSR 
designations and 82% of TMOR designations from May through August were given to units that 
submitted zero bids. 
Table 17 shows that the largest lead participants received a large proportion of their designations and 
revenues in hours that they were helping to set the price. A single lead participant can have many 
different generating units, each with a different TMNSR bid price in any given hour. If any of a lead 
participant’s generating units bid at least the clearing price and was given a positive designation then all 
of that lead participant’s units’ TMNSR revenue for that hour was included (likewise for TMOR). For 
anonymity, the bidders IDs have been renumbered and ordered from the greatest TMNSR revenue to the 
least for the May – August period. Of all of the TMNSR revenue that the first TMNSR provider received, 
46% was earned when the lead participant had a unit with positive designations that was bidding at least 
the TMNSR price. The second TMNSR provider sets the price most often (1006 out of 2952 total hours   16
with a successful bid of at least the TMNSR price), but when it did, the price was low, so the participant 
did not receive a great deal of revenue in these hours (only 5% of the participant’s total). 
3  The ISO’s short-term remedies 
Recognizing the signs of market failure in the reserve markets, the ISO introduced two short-term 
remedies. 
ISO Reserve remedy: Cap the reserve prices with the energy price. 
On June 27, 1999, the ISO capped the reserve prices with the energy price. Initially, this was done on 
a five-minute basis. Whenever the clearing reserve price in the five-minute interval was above the five-
minute energy price, the reserve price was reduced to the greater of the energy price or 0. This was 
applied to all three reserve markets (TMSR, TMNSR, and TMOR). Later, in July 1999, the ISO switched 
to applying the cap on an hourly basis. Whenever the reserve price in the hour was above the hourly 
energy price, the reserve price was reduced to the energy price. The shift from five-minute to one-hour 
application of the cap effectively raises the cap slightly, depending on the variability of prices within the 
hour.
11 
Despite the cap, there are several cases where the reserve prices were above energy price (see Table 
12). Many of these cases are the result of a downward revision of the energy price due to an emergency 
sale. If the revision occurs more than five days after the event, then the ISO does not have the power 
under the rules to revise the reserve prices. The few remaining cases are simply processing errors. Only 
recently has the ISO been able to automate the application of the cap. Thus, for most of the four-month 
period, the cap was applied manually, and some instances where the cap should have been imposed were 
missed. 
The cap on reserve prices improves the original market structure, but falls far short of an efficient 
solution. Consider the energy bid of a producer who is capable of supplying reserves. If the bidder knows 
that there will be a scarcity of reserves and that the reserve price will be capped by the energy price then 
the bidder has no incentive to submit a bid that will be successful in the energy market. If the bidder is 
selected to produce energy it will be paid the energy clearing price and will incur operating costs. If the 
bidder is not selected to produce energy it will be selected to provide reserves (everyone is selected when 
reserves are scarce). In this case the bidder will receive the energy clearing price (the capped reserve 
                                                      
11 If within hour prices are fairly stable, this change has little effect; if within hour changes are large, the 
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price) and will not incur operating costs. The bidder does strictly better if its energy bid is not selected 
because it avoids operating costs. To ensure that it is not selected the bidder will set its bid as high as 
possible. If all bidders follow this strategy a reasonable energy price cannot be produced. The gap 
between the energy price and the reserve price should induce suppliers to limit their energy bids. A price 
cap does not create this gap. Section 6 elaborates on the relationship between reserve prices and energy 
bids. 
ISO OpCap remedy: Cap the OpCap price in OP 4 conditions with five times the average of the 
three highest hourly clearing prices in the previous thirty days during non-OP 4 conditions. 
The cap on the OpCap price in OP 4 conditions was applied retroactively to the beginning of the 
market. The cap, however, was not binding until particular days in June. 
4  Options for medium-term remedies 
The ISO’s short-term remedies have been an essential and important step in improving the NEPOOL 
markets. Both remedies involve the use of price caps. Although price caps are inconsistent with 
competitive markets, their careful application in response to market design flaws is necessary. The ISO, 
recognizing the dangers of rigid price caps, wisely decided on market-based price caps, allowing the cap 
on reserves to vary with the energy price and allowing the OpCap cap to vary with the highest OpCap 
prices in non-emergency situations. Both of these remedies should be continued until a better solution can 
be implemented. 
The ISO and NEPOOL should continue to work aggressively on a long-term fix to the basic design 
flaws in the reserves. The recent work of NEPOOL’s Congestion Management and Multi-settlement 
Committee is an important step in the right direction. However, realistically it is unlikely that the long-
term solution will be implemented until 2001, given the complexity of the issues involved. Hence, it is 
important to identify a medium-term fix that the ISO can implement within a matter of months. We 
present such a medium-term solution below.  
Recommendation: Eliminate the OpCap market. 
The market flaws in the OpCap are severe. Fortunately, there is an easy medium-term fix that is also 
a long-term fix—eliminate the OpCap market. One cannot argue that the OpCap market serves any useful 
purpose as presently designed. Since its operation has real costs with no apparent gain, the market should   18
be eliminated. Capacity should be rewarded in the energy and reserve markets, and not in some phony 
market.
12 (The ISO has taken our advice and eliminated the OpCap market as of March 1, 2000). 
Recommendation: Adopt the smart buyer model for the reserve markets. 
We recommend that the reserve markets continue in the medium-term, but with the ISO adopting a 
smart buyer model for reserves. As a smart buyer, the ISO: 
1.  Never pays for additional reserves more than the economic value of the additional reserves. 
2.  Reduces its demand for reserves as reserve prices increase. 
3.  Shifts purchases toward higher quality reserves when they are priced less than lower quality 
reserves. 
In conducting the markets for reserves, the ISO is effectively purchasing reliability on behalf of load. The 
ISO has a responsibility to purchase wisely, given the aggregate preferences of load. On this basis, the 
ISO as smart buyer develops a demand curve for reserves that reflects the marginal value that additional 
reserves have for the system. 
The essential elements of the smart buyer model can be adopted in the medium-term. The ISO 
recently has implemented point 3 above. The reserves now are treated as a cascade with the ISO filling its 
need for lower quality reserves with higher quality reserves if the higher quality can be purchased at a 
lower price. The difficult step is establishing a demand curve for reserves, which reflects the marginal 
value of additional reserves. This will accomplish points 1. Point 2 is accomplished by integrating the 
demand curve with the unit commitment and dispatch programs. It will require some discussion among 
participants and regulators, but once new operating procedures are established the ISO can begin 
purchasing reserves according to its demand curve, rather than the current vertical “demand” curve, which 
does not reflect the marginal value of additional reserves. 
The demand curve for reserves may sound like an arbitrary object. One may fear that determining the 
demand curve will quickly turn into heated debates about the value of lost load. Although we anticipate 
lively discussions, we believe that a reasonable approximation of the demand curve can be constructed in 
an implementable way. The key is focusing on what a demand curve is. The demand curve for reserves 
                                                      
12 If participants want to play the “ask and it shall be given” game, they should do so on a voluntary basis. 
Moreover, the activity should not be orchestrated by the ISO, since it has nothing to do with running a 
reliable and efficient electricity market. We doubt that the game would survive such a market test.   19
specifies for every quantity of reserves the marginal value of additional reserves. Today there are tractable 
methods for determining these values from the shadow prices of the appropriate optimization problem.  
In what follows, we will assume that the ISO is able to construct a downward-sloping demand curve 
for reserves. 
Recommendation: Restructure the reserve markets. 
The basic flaws in the reserve markets stem from two features of the current markets: 
1.  The vertical “demand” curve, derived from a rigid reserve requirement, implies that prices are 
arbitrarily high in times of scarcity. 
2.  Losing bidders face the same obligations as winning bidders. 
The first flaw is eliminated by constructing the true demand curve for reserves, based on the 
marginal value of additional reserves. The second flaw can be solved in two ways. 
The first way is to construct one or more forward reserve markets. Then the losing bidders would 
learn that they are not needed to provide reserves, while they still have time to find something to do with 
their excess supply, such as offering it in another market. This is the approach used in California and 
some other markets (Chao and Wilson 1999). We do not believe that this is a feasible solution in the 
medium-term. The construction of new markets cannot be done in a few months. Day-ahead reserve 
markets are planned in the long run as part of the CMS/MSS Straw Proposal. 
The second solution to flaw 2 is to revise the structure of the reserve markets in a way that is 
consistent with the basic market features in place today. These basic features are (1) ex post clearing, and 
(2) an obligation of all operable capacity to participate in the market (i.e., respond to the dispatch 
instructions of the ISO). Features (1) and (2) imply that the true supply curve is in fact vertical—a fixed 
supply of reserves is offered to the market regardless of price. This is illustrated in the diagram below. 
The first pane illustrates the current market structure for reserves. The bidders submit offers from which 
the aggregate “supply” curve (S) is formed. The ISO establishes the reserve requirement, forming the 
vertical “demand” curve (D). The ISO then designates the reserves (QD) and the clearing price (P). Those 
with bids below P are paid; those with bids above P are not. All available supply (QS) provides reserves in 
the sense that they provide dispatch flexibility to the extent that they can respond to dispatch instructions. 
Under the revised market structure illustrated in pane (b), the clearing price is found by intersecting 
the true supply curve (ST), computed by the ISO based on the participants’ ability to respond to dispatch   20
instructions, and the true demand curve, computed by the ISO from its dispatch and ancillary 
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(b) Revised Market Structure for Reserves 
QS 
  The revised market structure replaces the flawed markets for reserves with markets based on sound 
economic principals. 
5  The marginal value of reserves 
A demand curve is a useful conceptual tool, but slightly misleading. What we envision is a demand 
function, which maps system conditions to a vector of three reserve prices. For example, the TMSR price 
will be decreasing in the amount of TMSR available (as demonstrated by drawing a downward-sloping 
demand for TMSR), but it will also be decreasing in the amount of TMNSR and TMOR available. When 
a single function is used to produce all three prices there is no need for a sequential clearing of markets. 
The function should be derived so that it sets prices that increase with the quality of the reserve. The 
TMSR price will be at least the TMNSR price which will be at least the TMOR price. 
5.1  Estimating the marginal value of reserves 
The purpose of the reserve markets must be identified before any technique for the estimation of 
marginal value can be determined. Ideally real time reserves should be used solely to protect the 
reliability of the system in the event of generator forced outages (Hirst and Kirby 1998). However, in 
New England the lack of day-ahead markets for operating reserves shifts some of the burden of protecting 
against load-forecast errors to the real time reserves. An estimation of the true marginal value of   21
additional reserves must include the contribution to bulk-power reliability as well as the commercial value 
added by the additional system capacity. 
Significant theoretical work has been done on the valuation of scheduled reserve capacity, 
particularly for spinning reserve. Sufficient scheduled reserve capacity can correct for load forecasting 
errors and generator outages without load shedding. The value of reserves can be calculated as the value 
of the expected load that would have been shed if reserves were not available. It should be pointed out 
that the engineering literature has focused on scheduled reserves, not reserves that are designated in real 
time. Scheduled reserves can be thought of as call options. There is some positive probability that the 
system operator will exercise the option and use the reserve for energy in real time. When reserves are 
designated in real time there is zero probability that the reserve is used for energy; a unit is designated as 
providing reserves or energy, not both. From the perspective of real time the relevant uncertainty 
pertaining to reserves is the possibility of a contingency arising in the short-term future. 
5.2  The model for summer 2000 
We have worked with the staff of ISO New England to develop a model for the valuation of real time 
reserves. The model does not produce full demand curves. Given the reserves available it finds the 
marginal value of one additional hypothetical unit of reserves. This marginal value represents the height 
of the demand curve at its intersection with supply. Hypothetical units of TMSR, TMNSR, and TMOR 
are valued, producing three reserve prices, which descend with the quality of the reserve service provided. 
The ISO plans to use the model for settlement in the summer of 2000, and may eventually adjust the 
model to integrate with dispatch operations and forward markets. A brief overview of the model is 
presented here. Further documentation of the model is available on the ISO’s website.
13  
The two distinct uses of reserves are identified and valued. First, the existence of reserves allows the 
system operator to respond to contingencies without shedding load. One more MW of reserves means that 
one less MW of load will have to be shed if a sufficiently large contingency arises. Ten-Minute Spinning 
Reserve (TMSR), Ten-Minute Non-Spinning Reserve (TMNSR), and Thirty-Minute Operating Reserve 
(TMOR) all contribute to this function. The second component of marginal value is added to the TMSR 
and TMNSR price to reflect their ability to protect the stability of the system from unexpected 
contingencies over a ten-minute time horizon. It may not be possible to shed sufficient load on short 
notice to restore interchange with the rest of the interconnection in the required time. If this is true then 
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TMSR and TMNSR do not merely save load shedding, they also may prevent cascading failure of 
transmission lines, and the NERC and NPCC penalties that come with violating tie-line constraints. 
The model recognizes that the reliability of the electrical system, and the effect of the addition of a 
unit of reserves on that reliability, is highly dependent on the current state of the system. To derive an 
accurate estimation of the marginal value of reserves the current state of the system must be described 
with precision. Data that is needed to model the system includes:  
1)  Failure and duration rates of each generating unit 
2)  Capacity of each generating unit 
3)  Dispatch status of each generating unit (how much energy and/or reserve the unit is currently 
providing) 
4)  Response Rate of each generating units 
5)  Start up times of rapid start units and hot reserve units 
6)  The realizations of load (ex post realizations can be used as a proxy for short term forecasts) 
7)  The amount of load which can be shed within ten minutes 
The model uses the inputs above and standard statistical techniques to form a Capacity Outage Probability 
Table (Gooi et al. 1998, Billinton and Allan 1996) for each of a series of lead times. The table describes 
the probability of suffering each of a series of possible MW outages at some time in the future.  
5.2.1  The first component of marginal value – value of energy saved 
The expected amount of energy saved by the addition of a marginal reserve unit is calculated as 
difference between Expected Energy Not Supplied without considering the reserve unit and Expected 
Energy Not Supplied with the reserve unit considered. Expected Energy Not Supplied is calculated using 
the expected load shed at each moment of time in an interval spanning from the present to the final lead 
time. The final lead time is chosen as the time it takes for sufficient capacity to become available so that 
any contingency that may occur at the present moment will be covered. This time may be the start up time 
of a cold reserve unit, or approximately 4 hours. For this part of the estimation of marginal value it is 
assumed that load is shed whenever there is a capacity shortage. If load exceeds capacity the difference   23
between the two (the shortage) is shed.
14 Both load and capacity are random variables. Uncertainty in load 
is evaluated using historical data on the accuracy of the ISO’s forecasts. Uncertainty in capacity is 
evaluated using the Capacity Outage Probability Table. For each of a series of lead times, the model 
predicts the probability of each of a series of potential capacity shortages. A weighted sum of these 
potential shortages gives the expected shortage for the lead time. The Expected Energy Not Supplied is 
found as the integral of expected shortage over all lead times from the present until the final lead time. 
Expected Energy Not Supplied is not of interest itself – the marginal value of reserves is the value of 
one additional reserve unit. Hypothetical TMSR, TMNSR, and TMOR units are added to the model one 
at a time in order to calculate the effect of each on Expected Energy Not Supplied. This drop in Expected 
Energy Not Supplied is attributed to the marginal unit and is used to derive the first component of 
marginal value.  
(d) hypothetical TMOR unit added
(b) hypothetical TMSR unit added
(c) hypothetical TMNSR unit added
(a) no hypothetical units












                                                      
14 The effect of voltage reductions and other corrective actions is not considered. Because of this and 
other simplifying assumptions Expected Energy Not Supplied should be viewed as an index of system 
reliability in the short-term future, and should not necessarily be interpreted literally. Value of Lost Load 
should be scaled appropriately.   24
The figure above demonstrates this process (the figure is very abstract and the shapes of the curves 
should not be taken literally). Expected shortage is measured by the height of the curve in pane (a). 
Expected shortage is determined by two opposing forces. Expected shortage tends to rise over time 
because given that a unit is operational the probability that the unit suffers an outage grows as the lead 
time considered grows. Expected shortage tends to fall over time because the capacity available from 
reserve units grows over time. These two forces cause the graph of expected shortage to initially rise and 
eventually fall back down. The area underneath the graph of expected shortage represents the Expected 
Energy Not Supplied between the present and the final lead time.  
The addition of hypothetical units causes the graph of expected shortage to fall and therefore causes 
a decrease in Expected Energy Not Supplied. Pane (b) shows the addition of a TMSR unit. The 
hypothetical unit has an immediate impact on the expected shortage because the unit begins ramp up 
immediately. Expected Energy Not Supplied falls to the lower area, and the lightly shaded area represents 
the expected energy saved by the TMSR unit. Panes (c) and (d) show the addition of non-spinning reserve 
units. The units only have an effect on expected shortage after the start-up time of the unit has elapsed. 
Because of this and because there is a significant probability that a non-spinning reserve unit will fail to 
start the expected energy saved by the non-spin units will be less then the expected energy saved by the 
spin unit. 
The amount that the hypothetical unit decreases Expected Energy Not Supplied is scaled 
appropriately for incorporation in a price per MWh, and is multiplied by the Value of Lost Load (VOLL) 
to produce the first component of marginal value. VOLL is a crucial unobservable parameter in the 
valuation of reserves. Reserve prices should never exceed VOLL since load can always be shed to 
produce reserves. Estimates of VOLL range from $2/kWh to $25/kWh. Surveys show that VOLL is 
dependent on the duration of interruptions, the number of interruptions, the time of day, the time of year, 
availability of advance warning, the location of the interruption, as well as other variable factors. If 
VOLL is assumed to be constant, and is set to the average of all of its possible values, it will not precisely 
reflect the true cost of shedding load at any given time (Kariuki and Allan 1996). The model that we have 
developed for ISO New England does not take into account this ambiguity in the concept of VOLL. A 
more sophisticated model would value outages based on their duration. 
5.2.2  The second component of marginal value – ten-minute response value 
In the discussion above we used “expected shortage” and “expected load shed” interchangeably. This 
assumes that it if there is not sufficient capacity to cover load then load will have to be shed. It is 
conceivable that there may be a delay before load can be shed if an outage occurs unexpectedly. If this is   25
true then the service provided by reserves is underestimated by the value of load saved. Reserves may 
enable the system operator to restore balance between production and consumption before damage is done 
to transmission lines and before tie-line constraints are violated. The ten-minute response component of 
the TMSR and TMNSR prices estimates this contribution to system reliability. Many of the costs of slow 
recovery are incurred in other control areas and are hard to quantify. The penalties levied for violating the 
constraints are designed to internalize this externality and can be used as a proxy for the true external 
cost. In addition to the penalties, costs of violating constraints may include the administrative costs of 
applying a punishment, the cost of public relations, and the possibility of being sued by other control 
areas. All of these costs can be aggregated into a single value that defines the cost of failing to cover an 
outage with sufficient reserve or load shedding within ten minutes. 
An “imbalance” occurs if there is a capacity outage that exceeds the ability of the system to respond 
with reserves and load shedding.
15 Note that an imbalance is not the same as what we called a shortage 
above. A shortage occurs if load exceeds capacity so that load must be shed. An imbalance occurs only if 
load exceeds capacity by so much that load cannot be shed sufficiently. The probability of an imbalance 
at a lead time of ten minutes is chosen as a basis for measuring the reserve response value because NERC 
guidelines call for tie-line balance to be restored within ten minutes of a contingency. 
The derivation of the second component is very similar to the derivation of the first. The model is 
analyzed without any hypothetical units and the probability of an imbalance at the lead time of 10 minutes 
is recorded. The model is analyzed after the addition of a hypothetical TMSR unit and the probability of 
an imbalance at ten minutes is recorded. Because an imbalance is less likely to occur when more reserves 
are available it must be that the addition of the hypothetical unit reduces the probability. The reduction in 
the probability of an imbalance due to the addition of a hypothetical unit is appropriately scaled and is 
multiplied by the cost of an imbalance to give the ten-minute response value. The TMSR ten-minute 
response value will be greater than the TMNSR ten-minute response value due to the probability that the 
hypothetical TMNSR unit will fail to start. A TMOR unit provides no response within ten minutes. 
5.3  Reserve valuation and unit commitment 
Reserve valuation models can be used for more than just the determination of prices. Gooi et al. 
(1998) develop a method for incorporating the estimated value of spinning reserves into a Lagrangian 
Relaxation Unit Commitment program. They show that overall cost savings are achieved when the 
reserve requirement is adjusted during unit commitment based on the balance of costs and benefits (see 
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also Tseng et al. 1999; Guan and Luh 1996). When reserve valuation is integrated with unit commitment 
or a fully functioning day-ahead market the ISO can act as a smart buyer. The ISO will be able to reduce 
purchases of reserves as the cost of supplying reserves increases and will be able to shift purchases to 
higher quality reserves when it is economical to do so. Critics of the ISO’s performance in the summer of 
1999 claim that the unit commitment program scheduled too many units. Units were often dispatched to 
their Low Operating Limits resulting in large reserve margins and low prices. If an accurate reserve 
valuation model is used in unit commitment excess scheduling can be avoided. 
6  Reserve payments’ effect on energy bids 
When the ISO chooses which units to dispatch from the energy bid stack it also determines which 
units are left over to provide reserves. In New England the decision to choose an inflexible unit out-of-
merit order so as to save a flexible unit for reserves is left to the discretion of the system operator. If a 
demand curve representing the marginal value of reserves is introduced this dispatch decision can be 
made easily within a cost (including interruption cost) minimizing framework. In order to determine 
which units to dispatch the ISO must determine what is truly expressed by the generators’ energy bids. 
The opportunity to earn revenue in reserve markets can have an effect on energy bids. Even in the 
absence of market power a generator’s energy bid may not express its operating costs. A simple 
theoretical model illustrates this.  
6.1  A simple theoretical model 
The current reserve market structure is so fundamentally flawed that any attempt to analyze it with 
formal economic theory is doomed to end in nonsensical results. The following analysis assumes that the 
ISO revises the markets, as we have proposed above, and sets the reserve price to marginal value. For 
simplicity we consider a single reserve market, and consider two types of generating units – units that are 
capable of providing reserves and units that are incapable of providing reserves. The proposed reserve 
market can be treated as a Cournot auction. Unlike most auctions there is no price component to each bid. 
The quantity component of each bid is also unusual—bidders determine which units will be available for 
reserves through their decisions to make capacity available and through their energy bids. Bidders do not 
know with certainty what quantity of reserves they are bidding because there is uncertainty about load and 
therefore uncertainty about which units will be called for generation. The choices that define the reserve 
bid are identical to the choices that define the energy bid, so inefficient pricing in the reserve market will 
result in inefficiencies in the energy market.    27
Capacity availability decisions and energy bids are set day-ahead. The energy bid for each generating 
unit consists of a non-decreasing schedule of prices and quantities.
16 The ISO aggregates all day-ahead 
energy bids to produce a supply function, S(p), which represents the total capacity bid at less than the 
price p. Since the ISO stacks bids from lowest to highest, S(p) must be a nondecreasing function. S(p) can 
be expressed as the sum of two function: S(p) = S
1(p) + S
2(p) where S
1(p) represents the aggregate supply 
function of units that are capable of supplying reserves (and eligible for reserve payments) and S
2(p) 
represents the aggregate supply function of units that are incapable of supplying reserves. In real time the 
random variable Q, representing load, is realized and an energy spot price, P, is determined such that S(P) 
= Q. For now we assume that the ISO does not consider a unit’s reserve eligibility when it decides which 
units will produce energy, it simply takes the energy bid stack as given and follows the merit order. Units 
that bid below the energy clearing price produce energy and are paid the uniform energy price. Units that 
bid above the energy clearing price produce nothing and receive the reserve clearing price if they are 
eligible.  
All unused capacity of reserve capable units is assumed available for reserves. Call this unused 
capacity K where K = S
1(∞) - S
1(P). The reserve price is determined by the function R(Q, K). For 
simplicity we assume that R does not depend on response rates, the inherent reliability of specific units, 
or more complicated system effects. The functional form of  R is determined by the ISO before the 
opening of the market and is known by all participants. In this section of the paper we do not attempt to 
explain how the ISO sets R; we take R as given and use it to predict bidder behavior. Assume that R is 
continuous and differentiable in both arguments and strictly increasing in Q and strictly decreasing in K. 
Let F(Q) be the probability that load falls below the value Q from the perspective of one day in 
advance. Call the lowest and highest possible load levels Q  and Q  so F(Q ) = 0 and  
F(Q ) = 1. Assume that F has a positive density, f, for all values of load between Q  and Q .  
Some simplifying assumptions allow us to address bidding behavior. We consider all bidders to be 
small compared to the size of the overall market so that bidders do not actively attempt to game the 
energy price or the reserve price. This assumption allows us to consider the bid of each generating unit 
independently. Furthermore assume that the costs of generating units are heterogeneous and dispersed 
                                                      
16 Typically energy bid schedules are restricted to a finite number of steps. No such restriction is made 
here.   28
such that S(p) is continuous and  () Sp ′  exists and is positive for all quantity values between Q  and Q .
17 
These assumptions guarantee that there is a unique solution to S(P) = Q and therefore a unique clearing 
price. This market clearing equation can be inverted to give the functional relationship defining the 
energy clearing price for every realization of load, P = P(Q). 
Consider the problem of a reserve capable supplier who has already decided to make its unit 
available. The remaining choice is what bid price should be submitted. Since generating units are 
assumed to be atomistic, the bid of one unit does not affect the probability that another unit will be called 
for generation, and does not affect either price. There is no strategic interplay between the bids of a 
supplier, so we can consider all of the supplier’s generating units and each megawatt of capacity within 
each of the supplier’s units independently. Assume that the operating cost of the bidder is such that there 
is some chance that the bidder will be the marginal bidder. 
The real time payoff (ignoring availability costs) per MWh for an increment of capacity with 
marginal cost, c, can be expressed in terms of its bid b: 
() 1
() ( ,) (,)() (() )()
Sb Q
QS b bc RQK f Qd Q PQ cf Qd Q π =+ − ∫∫. 
If the realization of load is below S(b) the reserve price is paid; if the realization of load is above S(b) the 
energy price is paid and the operating cost is incurred. Maximization of this real time payoff with respect 
to b yields the first order condition: 
( ) ( ( ))[ ( ( ), ) ( ( )) ] 0 SbfS b R S bK P S b c ′ −+ = . 
This can be simplified to give the expression defining the optimal choice of b (assuming the second order 
condition holds), denoted b*: 
1)  *( ( * ) , ) bR S b Kc =+ . 
Bidders who can supply reserves forecast what the reserve price would be if their bid was the marginal 
bid in the energy market and add this value to marginal cost to produce their bid. This inflation of the bid 
                                                      
17 A sufficiently generous reserve price function will ensure that there is enough supply to satisfy even the 
highest load contingency Q . If we assume that R is set such that S(∞) is strictly greater thanQ  then we do 
not have to worry about the existence of a supplier who knows that his bid will necessarily be accepted in 
some states of the world. The entry of a surplus of suppliers can only be rationalized if the excess 
suppliers have zero availability cost. These suppliers can be thought of as dispatchable load.   29
above marginal cost is not an attempt to push up the energy price, it is merely an inclusion of all costs of 
being selected to produce energy—the operating cost and the opportunity cost of lost reserve revenue. 
There is no opportunity cost for a bidder who is ineligible for reserve payments, so reserve ineligible 
bidders bid their operating cost only. 
If all reserve eligible bidders follow the optimal bidding strategy given in equation 1), then the 
marginal reserve eligible bidder
18, i.e. the bidder who sets the energy clearing price, bids exactly the 
reserve price above its marginal cost. If C
1(q) represents the marginal cost of the unit in the reserve 
capable bid stack that has q MWs of cheaper reserve capable capacity below it (the aggregate marginal 
cost function of reserve capable units) and C
2(q) represents the marginal cost of the unit in the reserve 
incapable bid stack that has q MWs of cheaper reserve incapable capacity below it (the aggregate 
marginal cost function of reserve incapable units) then we can express the inverse supply function as
19  
2)  P(Q) = R(Q, K) + C
1(S
1(P(Q))) or 
3)  P(Q) = C
2(S
2(P(Q))). 
Differentiation of equation 2) with respect to Q yields 
1









=− <  and 
11 1
0
dC dC dS dP
dQ dq dP dQ
=>   
                                                      
18 The assumption that both S
1(p) and S
2(p) are continuous implies that the last reserve capable unit 
accepted and the last reserve incapable unit accepted both bid the same amount – the clearing price. Both 
of these bidders can claim to be the marginal unit. 
19 This expression assumes that when the realization of load is Q, the MW that sets the energy price is the 
one with Q units of cheaper capacity. This assumption is verified when it is shown that bids are increasing 
in cost.   30
No matter how the ISO sets the reserve price function, energy suppliers always bid so that the energy 
price is more sensitive to an increase in the realization of load than the reserve price is.
 20 This result 
implies that the second order condition always holds.
21 




















Bids of reserve eligible units increase with marginal cost. The bids of units that are unable to supply 
reserves also increase with cost. This guarantees that the lowest operating cost units of each type are 
selected to produce energy. However, since each reserve eligible unit adds an opportunity cost to its bid 
some reserve ineligible units will be called to produce energy even though they have higher operating 
costs then some units that are left for reserves. The operating cost component puts the reserve eligible 
units relatively high in the energy stack. 
6.2 Efficiency  Implications 
The efficiency in the dispatch of units based on the bidding behavior solved for above is dependent 
on the accuracy of the reserve price function. If the reserve price function is set as an accurate 
representation of the marginal value of reserves then the opportunity cost added to a unit’s energy bid 
reflects the cost to society of the unit being unavailable for reserves. Economic efficiency demands that 
this cost be considered in the dispatch of units. The placement of units that are available for reserves 
relatively high in the merit order is desirable. A system operator should be more reluctant to dispatch the 
flexible units because in doing so the reserve margin is decreased. 
Consider the problem of a social planner who chooses which units to dispatch in order to minimize 
the sum of operating costs and interruption costs subject to the load requirement. Assume that the reserve 
                                                      
20 If R is differentiable with respect to Q and K and strictly increasing in Q then the earlier assumption 
that  () Sp ′ exists and is positive holds. 
21 The second order condition can be expressed  1 (* ) ((* ) ) [ (* ) ((* ) , ) 1 ] 0 Sb fS b SbRS b K ′ ′ −≤. This can 
be rearranged to give  1
1
((* ) , ) ((* ) )
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price function accurately describes the marginal interruption costs avoided. Let 
1 S  and 
2 S  represent the 
energy supplied by reserve capable and reserve incapable units respectively. Let l 1 S  and  m 2 S represent the 
total capacity available from the two types of units. Assume that the total capacity available from each 
type of unit is sufficiently large so that the constraints l 11 SS ≥  and  m 22 SS ≥  do not bind. After observing 





min ( ) ( ) ( , )
SS S S
SS
C q dq C q dq R Q k dk
−
+− ∫∫ ∫  
subject to 
12 SSQ +=  
If λ is used as a Lagrange multiplier then the first order conditions of the constrained optimization 
problem are 
4)  l 11 1 1 () ( , ) 0 CS R Q S S λ +− − =  and 
5) 
22 () 0 CS λ −= 
Along with the constraint, these first-order conditions define the optimal quantity choices. Equations 4) 
and 5) are identical to equations 2) and 3) with the shadow price λ taking the place of the energy clearing 
price and the efficient quantity choices of the social planner taking the place of the decentralized 
equilibrium of the auction. Therefore, the auction achieves the efficient dispatch of units that are made 
available. 
The intuition behind these results can be seen with a simple example. Consider two units with equal 
generating capacity. Unit A is eligible to receive the reserve payment, and unit B is ineligible. Unit A has 
operating costs of $25/MWh and unit B has operating costs of $30/MWh. For simplicity assume that the 
reserve price function takes the constant value of $10/MWh. The above analysis shows that if the bidders 
have no market power then unit A will bid at $35/MWh and unit B will bid at $30/MWh. If load is 
realized such that the energy clearing price is $32/MWh then unit B will be dispatched for energy and 
make operating profits of $2/MWh while unit A will receive the reserve payment of $10/MWh and incur 
no operating costs. Dispatching unit B instead of unit A is efficient even though unit A has lower 
operating costs. Including unit A in the dispatch instead of unit B would save $5/MWh in operating costs, 
but would sacrifice $10/MWh in reserve value.   32
As long as reserves are priced efficiently a system operator need only consider energy bids to 
achieve an efficient dispatch. If units A and B were forced to bid their operating costs a smart system 
operator would recognize the social cost involved with the dispatch of A and would choose to dispatch 
unit B out of merit order so as to save A for reserves. By allowing A and B to bid freely the system 
operator can stick to the merit order
22 since A has already incorporated all social costs in its bid. 
It should be noted that the inclusion of opportunity costs in energy bids is not unique to the proposed 
market. Any auction where winning eliminates profitable opportunities will result in this same type of 
bidding. If instead of automatically giving suppliers reserve designations the ISO forces suppliers to bid 
for them, there is still a loss of expected reserve revenue when a unit is called for generation. Theory 
predicts that this opportunity cost must be added to the unit’s energy bid. If reserve markets are settled 
day-ahead, as they are in California, bidders in the day-ahead energy market will incorporate the profit 
opportunities available in the reserve markets (and real time energy market) in an opportunity cost 
component of their bid. 
System operators may be skeptical about encouraging reserve eligible bidders to include the 
opportunity cost of lost reserve payments in their energy bids. The reserve price should be very 
significant in times of scarcity, and bids significantly above operating cost are viewed with suspicion. 
Also, the market presented above does not take advantage of the ISO’s informational advantage. Bidders 
must predict what the reserve price would be if they were the marginal unit - the ISO knows the actual 
realized value.  
A revision of the dispatch rule induces bidders to submit operating costs and maintains the efficient 
dispatch. The system operator tells bidders that the reserve price (marginal value of reserves) will be 
added to their bid when the bid is considered in the energy stack. This eliminates the need for reserve 
eligible bidders to include an opportunity cost component in their bid – the system operator does it for 
them. If a reserve eligible bidder bids its operating cost they are dispatched if and only if the energy 
clearing price exceeds their operating cost by at least the reserve price. Units provide reserves when the 
reserve price exceeds their potential operating profit, and produce energy when their operating profit 
exceeds the reserve price. It is a weakly dominant strategy for all bidders to bid their operating cost. The 
dispatch is identical to the dispatch presented above and is efficient. 
If the reserve price function does not accurately represent the marginal value of reserves then the 
opportunity cost component of a unit’s energy bid does not accurately represent the social cost of 
                                                      
22 The merit order may not be followed due to intertemporal optimization.   33
including the unit in the energy dispatch. Arbitrary reserve pricing, as in New England’s current market 
structure, will lead to arbitrary energy pricing, even in the absence of market power.  
6.3  The Availability Decision 
To analyze the availability decision, consider units with one MW capacity and constant marginal 
cost. The cost of making a unit available, including labor costs, start-up costs, and opportunity costs, must 
also be considered. Let the availability cost of a reserve eligible unit with marginal cost c be 
1() c σ . Let 
the availability cost of a reserve ineligible unit with marginal cost c be
2() c σ . Units with high operating 
cost have little opportunity for profit outside the market of interest, so they have low opportunity cost of 








 are assumed to be negative.  
A unit enters the market if the payoff from entering exceeds the availability cost. The entry 
conditions for reserve eligible and ineligible units are: 
6) 
(* ) 1
(* ) (,)() (() )() ( )
Sb Q
QS b R QK fQd Q PQ cfQd Q c σ +− ≥ ∫∫ , and 
7) 
2
(* ) (() )() ( )
Q
Sb PQ cf Qd Q c σ −≥ ∫ . 
Equations 6) and 7) define the set of units that enter the market (the ISO’s role in unit commitment is 
ignored). Both sides of the inequalities are decreasing in c, so it is possible that low marginal cost units 
enter, high marginal cost units enter, or a mixture of both enter.  
An alternative way to state the entry condition is a supplier makes its capacity available as long as 
expected cost does not exceed expected revenue. Equations 6) and 7) can be rewritten as 
(* ) 11 1
0( * ) E(cost )= ( ) (1 ( ( *))) ( , ) ( ) ( ) ( ) E(revenue )
Sb Q
Sb c FSb c R QKfQd Q P QfQd Q σ +− ≤ + = ∫∫ , and 
22 2
(* ) E(cost )= ( ) (1 ( ( *))) ( ) ( ) E(revenue )
Q
Sb cF S b cP Q f Q d Q σ +− ≤ = ∫  
Expected cost can be increasing or decreasing in c, but expected revenue is strictly decreasing in c. 
1 E(revenue ) * *
( *) ( ( *))[ ( ( *)) *] ( *) ( ( *)) 0
dd b d b
Sb fS b R S b b c Sb fS b
dc dc dc
′′ =− = − < , or   34
2 E(revenue )
(* ) ((* ) )* 0
d
Sb fS b b
dc
′ =− < . 
Low operating cost units provide energy more often than high operating cost units because they place 
themselves lower in the stack. Because the energy price exceeds the reserve price (by marginal cost), the 
low cost units receive more expected revenue. 
This result may lead to inefficient availability decisions. The entry of a unit with low availability cost 
and high marginal cost may reduce the total cost of supplying load by the same amount as the entry of a 
unit with high availability cost and low marginal cost, but the high marginal cost unit is less likely to 
enter since it has lower expected revenue. This inefficiency arises because the energy market is run in real 
time and availability costs are sunk when the market clears. This does not depend on the method used to 
set the reserve price. Suppliers include availability costs in their energy bids only if energy schedules are 
set one day in advance. 
6.4 Market  Power 
Four major results follow from the above discussion. 
1.  Bidders take into account the opportunity cost of foregone reserve revenue when making their 
energy bids. 
2.  Bids of units that are eligible for reserve payments increase with operating cost. If all units are 
eligible to supply reserves then low cost units are called for energy before high cost units. If only 
some units are eligible for the reserve payment the units capable of supplying reserves will place 
themselves relatively high in the energy stack and will be called for energy relatively infrequently. 
3.  Regardless of how sensitive the reserve price function is to the realization of load, bidders submit 
an aggregate supply schedule that makes the energy price more sensitive to the realization of load. 
4.  Even if the reserve price is set accurately availability decisions may not be efficient. 
It is useful to consider how the theoretical results would be effected if the model was extended to 
include the existence of market power. From May through August 1999 in New England, two lead 
participants earned 47% of the energy revenue, 65% of the TMSR revenue, 58% of the TMNSR revenue, 
and 60% of the TMOR revenue. It is hard to argue that these lead participants have no price setting 
ability.  
If generating units are not atomistic then the bid of one unit affects the payoff function of other units. 
The capacity increments of a single supplier cannot be analyzed independently because all of the   35
supplier’s bids must be optimized simultaneously. A framework similar to the one presented by 
Klemperer and Meyer (1989) can be used to analyze the behavior of bidders when their strategy space is a 
schedule of prices and quantities. A unique equilibrium cannot be found in this environment (when the 
support of load is bounded), but Klemperer and Meyer show that in any equilibrium where all participants 
submit upward sloping supply functions, bids by all participants at all quantity levels are at least marginal 
cost.
23 When there is a real time reserve market to fall back on this marginal cost must include operating 
cost and opportunity cost. In the presence of market power, an energy bid will be at least marginal 
operating cost plus the reserve price conditional on that bid being the marginal bid. Therefore the energy 
price will exceed the marginal operating cost of the last reserve capable unit scheduled by at least the 
reserve price. 
When suppliers are asymmetric, the burden of lifting price above marginal cost falls 
disproportionately on the largest bidders.
24 A bidder with small capacity will bid close to marginal cost 
since its probability of setting the clearing price is low. A larger bidder with many units will be more 
willing to inflate bids above marginal cost because the probability that one of the bids set the price is 
greater, and when a bid does push up the price all of the bidder’s accepted capacity benefits. This 
imbalance can lead to an inefficient dispatch of available units. Units owned by large bidders will be 
placed inefficiently high in the merit order because of their inflated bids.  
Market power may result in additional distortions in availability decisions. In order for the reserve 
price to reflect the tightness of the market it must be decreasing in the amount of capacity available. This 
relationship results in a perverse incentive for a supplier with market power to withhold capacity in order 
to drive up the reserve price. This is perhaps the most compelling criticism of the real time reserve market 
and the best argument for why forward reserve markets should eventually be implemented. A similar 
problem was created by the market rules in England and Wales.  
6.5  Lessons from the English experience 
The central energy market in England and Wales, known as the pool, has used capacity charges and 
availability payments since its inception. These payments are determined day-ahead based on expected 
reserve margins and so are fundamentally different from what is proposed here. However, these payments 
                                                      
23 If marginal costs are upward sloping then only the lowest quantity increment and the highest quantity 
increment of any supplier can be bid at marginal cost. All other quantity will be bid strictly above 
marginal cost. 
24 This is a general result of uniform price auctions and has nothing to do with the reserve payment.   36
demonstrate the potential problems that arise when payments are made to suppliers based on the total 
availability of reserves.  
The capacity charge is part of the day-ahead pool purchase price and is paid per MWh of load 
served. The charge is calculated by subtracting the System Marginal Price (the price that clears the energy 
bid stack) from the estimated value of lost load (VOLL) and then multiplying by the loss of load 
probability (LOLP). VOLL was originally set at £2 per kWh and has increased annually. The LOLP is 
calculated for each half hour period of the coming day using conventional probability theory, and is a 
decreasing function of the expected amount of excess capacity available. Generators that have capacity 
available but not actually used receive the availability payment. A unit’s payment is calculated by 
subtracting the higher of the System Marginal Price and the unit’s bid price from VOLL and multiplying 
this by LOLP. 
The capacity charge and availability payment were designed to reward suppliers who were available 
when high load or generator outages cause the system to become tight. Economists criticized these market 
rules because suppliers can determine when the system becomes tight by strategically timing planned 
outages. Since LOLP increases as expected excess capacity decreases generators are able to gain large 
payments by withholding capacity. Bunn and Larsen (1992) show that the extreme convexity of LOLP at 
low levels of the expected reserve margin makes the incentive to withhold capacity especially strong 
when the expected reserve margin is low and the system is most vulnerable. Wolak and Patrick (1998) 
demonstrate that the two largest participants in the pool tend to reduce their availability below the levels 
that would be predicted by NERC average availability factors, and tend to reduce availability more often 
than other participants. This behavior is consistent with strategic capacity withholding because it is the 
largest participants that have the most to gain from reducing their availability. Wolak and Patrick also 
find that capacity withholding leads to low reserve margins even in hours where the System Load is 
relatively low. 
Like the English rules, the proposed revisions to New England’s reserve markets pay high amounts 
when availability is low. It is crucial that the markets be designed so that availability is not made low 
strategically in order to force high payments. We believe this is possible for the following reasons: 
1.  The proposed rules do not involve anything analogous to the English capacity charge. Suppliers of 
energy are rewarded with high prices in peak hours because the market clears far up the energy 
bid stack. There is no reason to add an ad hoc payment to the energy price reflecting the tightness 
of the reserve markets. As we have shown above, even in the absence of market power, rational 
bidding strategies will cause the energy price to rise as the reserve price rises. The incentive to   37
withhold capacity is obviously much less when the reserve margin only directly effects payments 
made to units providing reserves. Since reserve totals are a small fraction of energy produced, 
doing away with the capacity charge does away with much of the incentive to withhold capacity. 
2.  Market power in England and Wales was more of a problem than in New England. Deregulation 
in England and Wales resulted in only two firms that regularly set the price. In New England the 
two largest Lead Participants account for approximately half of the capability and slightly more 
than half of the revenue in the reserve markets. 
3.  Demand curves can be derived with sufficient elasticity so that a reduction in availability does not 
lead to an excessive price increase. Wolak and Patrick make a similar observation about the 
English market: 
The true value of the VOLL to consumers and the true relationship between the estimated reserve 
margin and LOLP are unknown to the regulator, but the magnitude of VOLL or the function specified 
to relate the expected reserve margin to the LOLP can have a tremendous impact on the observed 
market clearing prices. For example, setting the VOLL too high can make the payoff from strategic 
capacity choice timed with demand fluctuations during days and across the year a profitable strategy. If 
the relationship between the LOLP and the expected reserve margin is too steep in absolute value, this 
can also increase the profitability of this strategy. Consequently, the regulator overseeing the operation 
of the pool should view such variables as the VOLL and the function relating the reserve margin to the 
LOLP as instruments for obtaining the desired market outcomes, rather than as fixed constants or 
relationships.  
The ISO should not be constrained to choosing demand curves that reflect the marginal benefits 
of additional reserves precisely. If the marginal value is calculated to be very steep over a range 
of reserve levels, a mechanism can be used to flatten out the demand curve in that range. For 
example, the algorithm used to derive demand curves can be constrained to keep the demand 
curves above a specified elasticity. 
4.  A well-defined algorithm for determining each demand curve should be implemented, and its form 
communicated to all participants, but the ISO must retain the power to adjust the parameters and 
methodology of the algorithm in response to market performance. It is important that suppliers of 
reserves understand the market structure in order to participate efficiently, however, this should 
not constrain the ISO’s ability to make quick and decisive corrections. Corrections of the market 
flaws in England and Wales have been slow in coming. 
7  The reserve markets in the long-term 
For the reserve markets to be efficient, it will be necessary to create one or more forward reserve 
markets. Then the losing bidders would learn that they are not needed to provide reserves, while they still   38
have time to find something to do with their excess supply, such as offering it in another market. Chao 
and Wilson (1999) describe one approach, which has been adopted in California. Although construction 
of a new market cannot occur in a few months, the ISO and NEPOOL participants should continue their 
efforts toward a long-term solution of the reserve markets. 
The development of a long-term solution is beyond the scope of this paper. However, we will 
comment briefly on the design effort to date. The CMS/MSS Straw Proposal of November 1999 presents 
a multi-settlement proposal for reserves. In the day-ahead market, reserves are scheduled and generators 
make financial commitments to provide reserves. The real time market serves a balancing function. 
Deviations from the day-ahead commitments are settled at the real time prices. The real time reserve 
markets are structured just as we have described here. The smart buyer model is employed both day-
ahead and in real time. Thus, the CMS/MSS Straw Proposal is fully consistent with all of the 
recommendations made here. This will greatly ease the transition from the medium-term to long-term. In 
addition, the costs to implement the medium-term recommendations are easily justified, since all the tasks 
are required to implement the long run solution. In this sense, the medium-term solution is a natural step 
toward the long-run solution. 
One issue that has not yet been addressed in the reserve market discussions is the idea of decremental 
reserves. At times, the balancing problem is that there is too much generation. The reserve market should 
provide downward as well as upward flexibility. Doing so may have a positive impact in the market for 
incremental reserves. One of the major problems of the real time reserve markets is that they are 
inherently thin. One way to mitigate this problem is to rely more on forward markets. Another way is to 
allow for greater arbitrage opportunities between energy and reserve markets. By including all four 
combinations of demand/supply and incremental/decremental bids in the energy and reserve markets, new 
arbitrage possibilities will be created in these markets. As a result, the reserve markets will be more liquid 
and less prone to insufficient bids. 
8 Conclusion 
The OpCap and reserve markets have serious flaws that must be addressed. The ISO’s short-term 
fixes have been necessary and effective at addressing the immediate problems. However, better solutions 
can be adopted in the medium term. In particular, we recommend: 
1.  Eliminate the OpCap market. 
2.  Establish a downward sloping demand curve for reserves. The demand curve would be capped in real 
time by the energy price or zero, whichever is larger.   39
3.  Establish the true real-time supply curve as simply the quantity of the resource made available in real 
time. 
4.  Pay the clearing price to all resources that provide the service. 
5.  Never set a price in the TMSR market less than the largest lost opportunity cost. 
All of these changes are consistent with the CMS/MSS Straw Proposal. These changes represent an 
important step toward the long-term solution involving multi-settlement energy and reserve markets. 
These markets should be designed carefully to address the basic economic and engineering issues 
necessary for an efficient wholesale electricity market. 
Appendix: Overview of the markets 
ISO New England conducts seven interdependent markets in its operation of NEPOOL’s wholesale 
electricity market: (1) the energy market, (2-5) four markets for ancillary services, and (6-7) two capacity 
markets. A description of each is given below. For brevity, many important details are omitted. 
1.  The energy market is a residual market. Only the difference between a participant’s energy resources 
and its energy obligations is traded in the ISO market. These resources and obligations include 
amounts covered by bilateral contracts. Hourly bids, expressed in $/MWh, are submitted on a day-
ahead basis for the next 24 hours. The ISO then schedules the generating units that will run the 
following day based on minimizing total costs in the energy market, as represented by the accepted 
bids. The market is settled after the fact on an hourly basis. All transactions are priced at the (ex post) 
energy clearing price. Payments/receipts are equal to the MWh bought/sold times the clearing price. 
Suppliers are paid for out-of-merit-order dispatch to alleviate transmission congestion on the basis of 
their bids submitted in the energy market.
25 
2.  The ten-minute spinning reserve (TMSR) market is a full requirements market. All TMSR is 
bought/sold through the ISO. Bidding and settlement are done as in the energy market—hourly bids 
in $/MW for the next day are submitted, and the markets are settled hourly after the fact. Given the 
units dispatched to provide energy, the ISO selects the least-cost resources to provide required 
TMSR, taking into account bids and lost opportunity costs. Designated resources are paid the energy 
clearing price for any MWh provided. In addition, for every MW designated as spin, resources are 
                                                      
25 The bidder may not be paid its bid if certain transmission congestion structure and price screens are not 
satisfied.   40
paid the clearing price for spin, which is calculated from the bid plus lost opportunity cost. The total 
cost of providing TMSR is shared proportionally by load. 
3.  The ten-minute non-spinning reserve (TMNSR) market is a full requirements market. All TMNSR is 
bought/sold through the ISO. Bidding and settlement are done as in the energy market—hourly bids 
in $/MW for the next day are submitted, and the markets are settled hourly after the fact. Designated 
resources are paid the clearing price times the MW provided as reserved capacity. The total cost of 
providing TMNSR is shared proportionally by load. 
4.  The thirty-minute operating reserve (TMOR) market is a full requirements market. All TMOR is 
bought/sold through the ISO. Bidding and settlement are done as in the energy market—hourly bids 
in $/MW for the next day are submitted, and the markets are settled hourly after the fact. Designated 
resources are paid the clearing price times the MW provided. The total cost of providing TMOR is 
shared proportionally by load. 
5.  The automatic generation control (AGC) market is a full requirements market. All AGC is 
bought/sold through the ISO. Bidding and settlement are done as in the energy market—hourly bids 
for the next day are submitted, and the markets are settled hourly after the fact. AGC is measured in 
regs, which measures a unit’s ability to follow load. Units that can provide AGC at lowest cost based 
on bids, lost opportunity costs, and production cost changes are selected. Generators providing AGC 
are paid the clearing price for time on AGC times the number of regs plus a payment for AGC service 
actually provided plus any lost opportunity cost. The total cost of providing AGC is shared 
proportionally by load. 
6.  The operable capability (OpCap) market is a residual market. Only the difference between a 
participant’s operable capability resources and its operating capability obligation (load plus operating 
reserve) is traded through the ISO. Bidding and settlement are done as in the energy market—hourly 
bids in $/MW for the next day are submitted, and the markets are settled hourly after the fact. A 
clearing price is calculated based on the bids of those participants with excess operable capacity. 
Participants who are deficient in operable capability pay the clearing price for each MW to those who 
are in surplus and who bid a price less than or equal to the clearing price. 
7.  The installed capability market is a residual market. Only the difference between a participant’s 
installed capability resources and its installed capability obligation (load plus installed operating 
reserve) is traded through the ISO. Trading in this market occurs monthly. Bids are submitted in 
$/MW-month on the last day before the month begins. A clearing price is calculated based on the bids   41
of those participants with excess installed capacity. Participants who are deficient in installed 
capability pay the clearing price for each MW-month to those who are in surplus and who bid a price 
less than or equal to the clearing price. The market is settled ex post. 
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